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This note explores the powers of the Labour Court as envisaged 
in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), where a protected 
strike disintegrates into violent riotous conduct. The legal status 
of protected strikes raises important questions of law, namely: 
whether the Labour Court has the authority to alter the legal 
status of a strike; the autonomy of collective bargaining; and the 
legal test which the Labour Court should apply when intervening. 
The court in National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits & 
Allied Workers v Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd 2016 37 
ILJ 476 (LC) dealt with this precise problem. There can be no 
doubt that South Africa is plagued by widespread strike violence 
which often occur during protected strikes. However, this 
contribution poses the question whether the Labour Court has 
not overstepped its mandated jurisdiction and it questions 
whether such alterations of the status of strikes would have a 
positive effect on the institution of collective bargaining. 
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1 Introduction 
Does the Labour Court have the judicial authority to declare otherwise 
protected strikes to be unprotected on the basis of violent industrial action 
or would this disrupt the fragile collective bargaining balance established by 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter LRA)?1 This composite 
question has divided commentators into two schools of thought. On the one 
hand Rycroft2 supports the notion that strikes must be "functional" to 
collective bargaining and that violent industrial action may cause otherwise 
legitimate strikes to lose their protected status. On the other, Fergus3 
contends that if labour courts should assume such authority, it may 
undermine the foundations of the constitutional right to strike and disturb the 
collective bargaining equilibrium. 
Against the background of a South African labour market which is marred 
by strike violence,4 the Labour Court in National Union of Food Beverage 
Wine Spirits & Allied Workers v Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd5 
(hereafter Universal Product Network), in an otherwise well-reasoned 
decision, reached the questionable conclusion that it has the power to 
declare protected strikes unprotected on the grounds of violence. Even 
though the decision can be commended for cautioning against the abuse of 
interdicts in the intricate balance of collective bargaining, and for seeking 
alternative judicial remedy against strike-related violence, it is doubtful that 
the court reached the correct conclusion.6 
This contribution sides with the point of view that the Constitutional Court 
would probably find such an expansion of the Labour Court's jurisdiction 
unacceptable within the current statutory framework. The authors traverse 
the current legislative framework, analyse the reasoning of Universal 
Product Network, and compares it against constitutional principles and 
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1  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter LRA). 
2  Rycroft 2014 IJCLLIR 199-204. See also Rycroft 2015 ILJ 11. 
3  Fergus 2016 ILJ 1537-1548.  
4  Ngcukaitobi 2013 ILJ 846-848; Chinguno 2013 GLJ 163; and Benjamin 2016 
http://www.cth.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/South-African-Labour-Law-A-
Twenty-Year-Review.pdf 23. 
5  National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits & Allied Workers v Universal Product 
Network (Pty) Ltd 2016 37 ILJ 476 (LC) (hereafter Universal Product Network). 
6  Universal Product Network para 45. 
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alternative judicial remedies. In essence, this contribution takes the debate 
further and explores areas that were left unanswered by Rycroft and Fergus. 
2 The right to strike: The Constitution, 1996 and the LRA 
Section 23(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996's 
(hereafter the Constitution, 1996) in no uncertain terms enshrines the 
principle that "[e]very worker has - … (c) the right to strike". This section 
contains no other direct or implicit limitations to this right. This is contrary to 
other constitutional rights, such as the right to "[a]ssembly, demonstrate, 
picket and petition", which adds the prerequisite that such action should take 
place "peacefully and unarmed".7 
Despite this seemingly limitless right to strike, this judicial entitlement does 
not go unchecked. This right competes with other constitutional rights. So 
for example, the Bill of Rights provides that "[e]everyone has the right to 
freedom and security of person, which includes the right – … (c) to be free 
from all forms of violence from either public or private sources".8 There can 
be no doubt that otherwise seemingly legal strikes, which are tarnished by 
rampant violence,9 hold the potential of clashing with the right to freedom of 
person, and also quite likely with the right to property.10 It also goes without 
saying that the right to strike is also subject to the Constitution, 1996's 
limitation clause which provides that constitutional rights may only be limited 
to the extent that it is "justifiable in an open and democratic society".11 
Where does this leave the Constitution, 1996 and violent strikes? In what 
seems like a contradiction in any constitutional democracy which strives to 
adhere to the rule of law, it is fully accepted that striking workers may inflict 
damage on the adversary – the employer. As neatly pointed out by 
Cheadle,12 this fundamental right has a "distinctive nature".13 Even though 
                                            
7  Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter 
Constitution, 1996). 
8  Section 12(1) of the Constitution, 1996. 
9  See, for example, Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of SA 
Workers Union 2012 33 ILJ 998 (LC) paras 4-5 (hereafter Tsogo Sun Casinos); Food 
& Allied Workers Union on behalf of Kapesi v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Salt 
River 2012 33 ILJ 1779 (LAC) paras 4-5. In both cases the court acknowledged the 
occurrence of gratuitous violence that ranged from harassment, assault and arsonist 
attacks on non-striking employee houses to the shooting and killing of non-striking 
employees. The court lamented on this "state of lawlessness" which also affected 
members of the public. 
10  Section 25(1) of the Constitution, 1996 provides that "[n]o one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property". 
11  Section 36(1) of the Constitution, 1996. 
12  Cheadle "Constitutionalising the Right to Strike" 70. 
13  See above. 
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it "shares with some other human rights the right to exercise power, such 
as the right[s] to protest, …, it differs markedly from those constitutional 
rights because it is a right to inflict harm – economic harm". There can be 
no qualms against this dictum. It is to be highlighted though, that it contains 
no indication that any level of personal or physical harm would be tolerated 
within a constitutional democracy which strives to promote the rule of law.14 
The open-endedness of the right to strike is no constitutional flaw. As is the 
case with many other constitutional rights, they are generally stated without 
detailed definition. However, it does recognise that it will be interpreted 
taking account of international norms15 and it recognises that national laws 
could provide for legal regulation.16 
The LRA confirms that it seeks to give effect to the Constitution, 1996 and 
South Africa's obligations incurred as member of the International Labour 
Organisation (hereafter ILO).17 Importantly so, the LRA adds that it seeks to 
"advance economic development, social justice, [and] labour peace" at the 
workplace.18 The LRA's definition of "strike" also does not limit the right to 
strike to peaceful action or to feats that only cause economic as opposed to 
physical harm. The LRA loosely defines a strike as workers' "concerted 
refusal to work … for the purpose of remedying a grievance … in respect of 
any matter of mutual interest".19 Although it may be argued that it goes 
without saying that it implies the requirement of functionality to collective 
bargaining, it is not expressly stated. In its stead, the LRA does establish an 
intricate collective bargaining balance through the levers of lock-outs and 
replacement labour;20 dismissal of striking employees on the grounds of 
                                            
14  Section 36(1) of the Constitution, 1996. 
15  Section 39 of the Constitution, 1996 confirms that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
courts and tribunals "must" consider international law" and "may" consider foreign 
law. This entails in particular International Labour Organisation Conventions 87 and 
98 and the manner in which these norms have been understood by the Committee 
on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations.  
16  So, for example, s 23(5) of the Constitution, 1996 provides that "[e]very trade union, 
employers' organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective 
bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining". 
17  Sections 1(a)-(b) of the LRA. 
18  Section 1(d) of the LRA. The LRA aims to achieve this through one of its many 
objectives, specifically, s 1(d)(iv) of the LRA which calls for the promotion of effective 
resolution of disputes through the Labour Court. 
19  Section 213 of the LRA. 
20  Although not constitutionally entrenched, s 64 of the LRA give the employer a right 
to lockout workers in the instance of protected strikes and to replace striking workers 
with replacement labour in terms of s 76 of the LRA. 
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misconduct and operational requirements;21 and the consequences that 
meet protected and unprotected strikes.22 
The LRA limits employees' right to strike by imposing procedural 
requirements, such as obligatory conciliation, and prior written notice of the 
pending strike to the employer.23 The LRA also imposes a number of 
substantive limitations on strikes. Workers may not take part in a strike if the 
issue in dispute is bound by a peace clause in a collective agreement; if the 
issue in dispute is subjected to compulsory arbitration (such as for essential 
services); or if the issue in dispute concerns a rights issue that a party can 
refer to be arbitrated or adjudicated upon.24 The main consequences of a 
so-called "protected strike", are that a person so engaged does not commit 
a delict or breach of contract;25 and a person cannot be dismissed for 
participating in a strike and lawful conduct that supports a protected strike.26 
Nonetheless, of importance to this discussion, is the fact that even if a strike 
is protected in the idiom of the LRA, employers are not left remediless as 
acts that constitute an offence are not immune from delictual action, breach 
of contract, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings.27 It must also be 
highlighted that workers engaged in a protected strike may also be 
dismissed on grounds of misconduct and operational requirements.28 
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to interdict any person from 
participating in strikes that do not comply with the LRA.29 Even though the 
LRA has been decriminalised to the extent that it makes no provision for 
criminal sanctions in respect of unprotected strikes, the same cannot be 
concluded for unlawful conduct in a protected or unprotected strike.30 The 
Labour Court can order "just and equitable compensation" for any loss that 
can be ascribed to unprotected strikes.31 Amongst other factors, the Labour 
                                            
21  See the discussion that follows. 
22  See the discussion that follows. 
23  Section 64 of the LRA imposes the requirements of: referring a dispute to either the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration or a bargaining council for 
conciliation; the issuing of a certificate that confirms that the dispute remains 
unresolved; and 48 hours, or 7 days' notice to the employer, depending on whether 
the adversary is a private entity for the state. 
24  Section 65(1) of the LRA. 
25  Section 67(2) of the LRA. 
26  Section 67(4) of the LRA. However, it is to be noted that s 67(5) of the LRA does 
provide that this "does not preclude an employer from fairly dismissing an employee 
in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII for a reason related to the 
employee's conduct during the strike, or for a reason related to the employer's 
operational requirements". 
27  Section 67(8) of the LRA.  
28  Section 86(5) of the LRA. 
29  Section 168(1) of the LRA. 
30  Code of Good Practice on Picketing (hereafter the Code on Picketing). 
31  Section 68(1)(b) of the LRA. 
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Court must take account of whether the strike was in response to unjustified 
conduct by the employer and whether "the interests of orderly collective 
bargaining" were advanced.32 
More rigorous restrictions have been included relating to pickets. Here, the 
LRA specifies that members and supporters of a protected strike may only 
picket "for the purpose of peacefully demonstrating"33 in support of a 
protected strike.34 Even though the Code of Good Practice on Picketing 
(hereafter the Code on Picketing) states that picketers may carry placards, 
chant slogans and sing and dance, they may not "commit any action which 
may be unlawful, including but not limited [to] any action which is, or may 
be perceived to be violent".35 The Code on Picketing is also clear that "the 
police have the responsibility to enforce the criminal law" and to "arrest 
picketers for participation in violent conduct".36 
The LRA confers the Labour Court with wide powers, such as the making 
of any appropriate order, which includes the granting of urgent interim relief, 
a declaratory order, an award of damages and an order for costs.37 
However, even though it could be argued that these orders are sufficiently 
wide to include an interdict which prohibits a protected but violent strike,38 
or which declares a protected strike to lose legal protection, it is doubtful 
that it would pass constitutional muster. Such a provision has not been 
included in the broader scheme of the LRA and it will have to be implied as 
such. 
3 Facts of Universal Product Network 
The National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits & Allied Workers 
(hereafter the union) and Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd (hereafter the 
employer) failed to reach an agreement over a list of demands in relation to 
terms and conditions of its members' employment. The union adhered to 
the LRA's procedural requirements and issued a strike notice to the 
                                            
32  Section 68(1)(b)(i)-(iv) of the LRA. 
33  Section 69(1) of the LRA. 
34  Sections 69(11)-(14) of the LRA clothe the Labour Courts with explicit powers to 
intervene in unprotected pickets. 
35  Items (6) and (7) of the Code on Picketing. 
36  Item 7(3) of the Code on Picketing. 
37  Section 158 of the LRA. 
38  Both Rycroft 2014 IJCLLIR 208; and Fergus 2016 ILJ 1548 agree that the power to 
interdict a violent strike may be implicit in the powers of the court, but that it is 
nowhere explicitly stated. 
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employer on 6 October 2015.39 Further to this, picketing rules were agreed 
upon and a protected strike commenced on 12 October 2015.40 
The employer lodged an urgent application for an ex parte interdict in 
relation to various acts of strike related misconduct and political 
interference.41 The Economic Freedom Fighters (hereafter EFF) became 
involved by waving anti-sematic Israeli banners and pro-Palestinian flags 
and they demanded that Woolworths should discontinue their business 
relationship with Israel.42 The urgent interdict was granted on 30 October 
2015 and the rule nisi to show cause why it should not be made a permanent 
order was heard on 6 November 2015.43 
The trade union refuted claims of their involvement in either violence or 
political interference and contended that the strike remained protected as 
the EFF's involvement was purely a motion of solidarity with the workers.44 
The most significant issue before Van Niekerk J for the purpose of this 
contribution is whether the strike had ceased to be protected on account of 
violence and political interference in pursuit of workers' demands.45 
4 The finding of Universal Product Network 
Universal Product Network judgement was cognisant of the fact that interim 
interdicts have the deceptive ability not to be truly interim in nature, but 
rather has a permanent impact on the dynamics of collective barraging. Van 
Niekerk J quite correctly cautioned against any inappropriate interference 
by the Labour Court in the established power play balance in collective 
bargaining. With reference to interim interdicts, the court observed that 
"[i]nevitably, the order interferes with the power dynamics at play and, more 
often than not, its effect upon the exercise of a constitutional right is 
profound and the respondent's [union's] lack of alternative remedies 
acute".46 
                                            
39  Section 64(1) of the LRA. 
40  Section 69 of the LRA. 
41  Section 68(1) of the LRA provides that the Labour Court has the exclusive jurisdiction 
to entertain such an application in the case of any strike that does not comply with 
the requirement of the Act, inter alia taking into account the "interests of collective 
bargaining". 
42  Universal Product Network paras 19-20. 
43  Universal Product Network paras 3-5. 
44  Universal Product Network paras 22-23. 
45  Universal Product Network para 2. 
46  Universal Product Network para 8. See also O'Regan 1988 ILJ 965. According to 
O'Regan little weight is attached to the legitimacy of a strike in interdict applications 
due to the substantive nature of the law which favours employers. Furthermore "in 
South Africa, applications for interdicts to restrain strikes will often not turn on the 
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In response to the employer's argument that the strike was unprotected for 
lack of procedural compliance, Universal Product Network analysed the 
Constitutional Court's judgement in SA Transport and Allied Workers Union 
v Moloto47 (hereafter Moloto) which dealt with strike notices. The crisp 
question in that decision was whether it is necessary for every employee, 
which also includes non-union members, to issue a strike notice even 
though the trade union which bargains on behalf of the workers in the 
bargaining unit has already done so. With reference to Moloto, Van Niekerk 
J brushed the employer's contention that this was an unprotected strike 
aside and accepted that "the right to strike is protected in the Constitution 
as a fundamental right without express limitation and the constitutional 
rights conferred without express limitation should not be cut down by 
reading implicit limitations into them".48 
Applying the approach adopted by Moloto, the court concluded that the 
workers in this instance were engaged in a protected strike.49 Having come 
this far with the constitutional line of reasoning, Universal Product Network 
turned to the question of whether the Labour Court could alter the protected 
status of a strike in the face of violence. Van Niekerk J's point of departure 
was that the Labour Court had on a number of occasions confirmed that 
"violent and unruly conduct is the antithesis of the aim of a strike, which is 
to persuade the employer through the peaceful withholding of work to agree 
to the union's demands".50 
In relation to this aspect, the court considered the Labour Appeal Court 
decision in Edelweiss Glass & Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal 
Workers of SA51 (hereafter Edelweiss) where the court accepted the notion 
                                            
question of balance of convenience, because of the nature of the substantive law". 
In support of this assertion see also Rycroft 2014 IJCLLIR 203-204; and Cohen and 
Le Roux "Liability, Sanctions and other Consequences of Strike" 154-155. 
47  SA Transport and Allied Workers Union v Moloto 2012 33 ILJ 2549 (CC) (hereafter 
Moloto). 
48  Universal Product Network para 26, with reference to Moloto para 53 and 74 where 
it was held that when considering s 64(1) of the LRA it should be interpreted to give 
"proper expression to the underlying rationale of the right to strike, namely, the 
balancing of social and economic power". 
49  Universal Product Network para 26. 
50  Universal Product Network para 30. The court relied on Tsogo Sun Casinos para 13 
where it was held that "this court will always intervene to protect both the right to 
strike, and the right to peaceful picketing. This is an integral part of the court's 
mandate, conferred by the Constitution and LRA. But the exercise of the right to 
strike is sullied and ultimately eclipsed when those who purport to exercise it engage 
in acts of gratuitous violence in order to achieve their ends. When the tyranny of the 
mob displaces the peaceful exercise of economic pressure as the means to the end 
of the resolution of a labour dispute, one must question whether a strike continues 
to serve its purpose and thus whether it continues to enjoy protected status". 
51  Edelweiss Glass & Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of SA 
2011 32 ILJ 2939 (LAC) (hereafter Edelweiss). 
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of the transmutation of protected strikes to legitimate strikes. Even though 
this matter did not involve a violent strike, it dealt with workers changing tack 
during collective bargaining. The union referred a dispute about the 
acquisition for organisational rights for conciliation before embarking on a 
protected strike. During the course of collective bargaining the workers 
changed their demand to one dealing with a thirteenth cheque and the 
employer argued that the strike had evolved to an unprotected strike. The 
Labour Appeal Court accepted that a protected strike can metamorphose to 
an unprotected strike, but only if the protected strike has been used as 
"leverage to achieve other objectives in respect of which no strike action 
could be taken".52 An example of such disputes about which a trade union  
cannot legitimately strike, is a rights issue that can be referred to arbitration 
or adjudication.53 Edelweiss adopted a generous workers' friendly approach 
to the right to strike and concluded that the workers continued to be engaged 
in a protected strike as both issues about organisational rights and about a 
thirteenth cheque could be the subject of a protected strike. 
Edelweiss only assisted Universal Product Network in so far as it referred 
to the transmutation for protected to unprotected strikes. However, in an 
unexpected leap, the court turned to another option when it comes to the 
metamorphosis of a protected strike into one that is unlawful. The court 
accepted Rycroft's "functionality test" and explained that the: 
… proper approach, it would seem to me, is that proposed by Prof Rycroft … 
[who] suggests that the court ask the following question: 'Has misconduct 
taken place to an extent that the strike no longer promotes functional collective 
bargaining, and is therefore no longer deserving of its protected status?' In 
answering this question, Prof Rycroft proposes that the court weigh the levels 
of violence and efforts by the union concerned to curb it. He explains that this 
is not an anti-union proposal; rather, he imagines a balancing counter-
measure allowing unions to launch a similar court application for an order 
granting protected status to an otherwise unlawful strike if it is in response to 
unjustified conduct by the employer … . In my view, this is an eminently 
sensible approach to adopt.54 
Despite the fact that the court acknowledged the "practical difficulties" that 
could emerge when determining how much misconduct would have had to 
occur before the court intervenes,55 and the fact that the employer in this 
instance still had the remedy of contempt of court to their avail,56 the court 
                                            
52  Edelweiss para 52. 
53  See the limitation in respect of s 65(1) of the LRA discussed above; and Ceramic 
Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building and Allied 
Workers Union (2) 1997 18 ILJ 671 (LAC). 
54  Universal Product Network para 32. 
55  Universal Product Network para 32. 
56  Universal Product Network para 40. 
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did confirm that it has the authority to declare an otherwise protected strike 
to be unprotected on the grounds of violence. 
When ultimately weighing the facts of the matter, Universal Product Network 
in an objective and even-handedly way held that the level and degree of 
violence coupled with the political interference did not tilt the balance 
towards a finding that the protected strike called by the trade union became 
unprotected.57 However, despite this, it seem that the door has inevitably 
been opened by this decision for other Labour Court judges, who may be 
swayed towards decisions which place undue implied limitations on the 
constitutional right to strike, to overturn the protected status of strikes. 
5 Analysis of the Universal Product Network judgement 
5.1 Introduction 
In the part that follows Universal Product Network is evaluated against a 
number of core issues, namely the constitutional perspective, intervention 
by means of interdicts during collective power play and the availability of 
alternative remedies. This is followed by a critique on the adoption of the 
functionality test way in the Universal Product Network judgement. 
5.2 Constitutional perspectives 
Hepple emphasises the fact that contrary to many countries of the world, 
the South Africa Constitution, 1996 provides that the right to strike is an 
independent right.58 It is an individual right, exercised collectively, and it is 
not derived from other collective rights such as the right to freedom of 
association or the right to collective bargaining.59 This confers a particular 
status to the right to strike. 
In what is arguably one of the most significant Constitutional Court cases 
dealing with the right to strike, National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd,60 (hereafter Bader Bop) the court laid down 
telling principles regarding imposing limitations on the right to strike. In this 
instance the members of a non-recognised minority union sought to enforce 
                                            
57  Universal Product Network para 45. 
58  Hepple "Freedom to Strike" 31-32. This is contrary to the situation in a country such 
as Germany. There, the Federal Constitution does not contain an explicit right to 
strike, but is an extension of the collective freedom of association. The author 
mentions that the result of this is that only trade unions can call for legal strikes in 
Germany. 
59  Hepple "Freedom to Strike" 31-32. 
60  National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 24 ILJ 
305 (CC) (hereafter Bader Bop). 
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organisational rights by means of a strike, despite the fact that the LRA does 
not accord such rights to minority unions. 
The employer lodged an application for an interdict against the strike and 
the Labour Appeal Court granted the interdict.61 In their appeal to the 
Constitutional Court, the trade union argued that either the LRA had to be 
interpreted in such a fashion that the fundamental right to strike was not 
infringed upon, or in the alternative, the provisions of the LRA which regulate 
organisational rights (and which limits the right to strike) had to be declared 
to be unconstitutional.62  
O'Regan J considered the ILO principles pertaining to the right to freedom 
of association and the constitutional right to strike,63 and despite the LRA's 
neat structure relating to the granting of statutory organisational rights only 
to majority and sufficiently representative trade unions, it held that there was 
no explicit prohibition against minority trade unions engaging in strikes to 
gain non-statutory trade union rights.64 Although some scholars opined that 
the Constitutional Court performed legal gymnastics to reach this conclusion 
as the LRA should be construed to be unconstitutional in this regard,65 it is 
of importance to note that the court preferred to adopt the following 
approach: It asked the question "whether the Act is capable of an 
interpretation that … avoid[s] limiting constitutional rights".66 In other words, 
should there be a way of interpreting the LRA so that it does not limit the 
fundamental right to strike, that would be the Constitutional Court's 
preferred way of interpretation. Transplanted to Universal Product Network, 
the Constitutional Court will in all probability find that any interdict which 
overturns the protected status of a strike should be avoided if there is any 
other way of interpreting the LRA. 
More guidance regarding the Constitutional Court's views on strikes can be 
gleaned from the more recent Constitutional Court decision Transport & 
Allied Workers Union of SA on behalf of Ngedle v Unitrans Fuel & Chemical 
(Pty) Ltd67 (hereafter Unitrans). In this instance the court considered the 
                                            
61  See Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal and Allied Workers of SA 2002 
23 ILJ 104 (LAC). 
62  Bader Bop para 12. 
63  Bader Bop para 34 relied on the fact that "freedom of association is ordinarily 
interpreted to afford unions the right to recruit members and to represent those 
members at least in individual workplace grievances". See also Bader Bop para 35, 
where the Court stated that the "second principle relates to the right of a union to 
take industrial action to pursue its demands".  
64  Bader Bop para 40. 
65  Chicktay 2007 Obiter 159. 
66  Bader Bop para 39. 
67  Transport & Allied Workers Union of SA on behalf of Ngedle v Unitrans Fuel & 
Chemical (Pty) Ltd 2016 37 ILJ 2485 (CC) (hereafter Unitrans). 
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question under which circumstances protected strikes could become 
unprotected. Although the matter did not deal with a violent strike, it is 
instructive that the court only identified three reasons.68 Firstly, a protected 
strike can become unprotected should an employer fully remedy the 
grievance or comply with the demand that was at the centre of the strike. 
Secondly, should the trade union abandon the original demand and should 
they seek to achieve a different purpose that is not authorised. Thirdly, the 
parties could conclude an agreement that settles the dispute even though 
the employer has not yet fully complied with the trade union or workers' 
original demand. To this, the court added that "[a]bscent any of these 
methods of turning a protected strike into an unprotected strike, a protected 
strike remains protected".69 When applying these principles to the facts of 
the case, the court once again adopted a generous approach regarding the 
right to strike which favoured the workers. The court held that the strike in 
this instance remained protected. 
From the above decisions it is clear that the Constitutional Court will not 
readily imply limitations in the LRA which may rest rict the fundamental right 
to strike. Furthermore, the court would be hesitant to include other 
contingencies that had not been identified in Unitrans that would have the 
effect of altering the protected status of a strike. 
5.3 Interdicts in the process of collective bargaining  
A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out 
that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike related deaths, 
313 injuries and 3 058 people were arrested for public violence associated 
with strikes.70 A 2015 Department of Labour Report noted a significant rise 
in unprotected strikes up from 48% in 2014 to at least 55% of the total strikes 
in 2015.71 More recently, a 2016 Department of Labour Report recorded that 
out of the 122 strikes, that year, 59% were unprotected.72 It is against this 
background that a number of South African and international scholars have 
been exploring acceptable limitations against strikes.73 However, despite 
                                            
68  Unitrans paras 119-120. It must be noted that the Constitutional Court was of the 
assumption that the constitutionality of the LRA was not in question. 
69  Unitrans para 120. 
70  SAIRR 2013 http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/media-releases 
/Strike%20violence.pdf/. See also Benjamin 2016 http://www.cth.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/South-African-Labour-Law-A-Twenty-Year-Review.pdf 22-
23. 
71  DoL 2014 http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/documents/annual-reports 
/industrial-action-annual-report/2015/industrualaction_2015.pdf. 
72  DoL 2016 http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/documents/annual-reports 
/industrial-action-annual-report/2016/industrualaction_2016.pdf. 
73  Botha 2016 THRHR 387 argues that the right to strike must be used as a method of 
last resort especially in consideration that most demands do not relate to the 
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this trend, scholars such as the eminent Lord Wedderburn has recognised 
that: 
Without scrupulous care by the judiciary and sometimes even with it the 
interlocutory labour injunction can become a great engine of oppression 
against workers and their unions.74 
The LRA provides that the Labour Court may only grant an interdict which 
restrains a person from participating in a strike should the respondent be 
granted 48 hours' notice of the application.75 However, the Labour Court 
may permit a shorter than 48 hours' notice period provided the respondent 
has received a reasonable opportunity to be heard and the applicant has 
shown compelling cause through the facts presented why such shorter time 
should apply.76 In addition to this, a number of common-law requirements 
have to be met.77 Firstly, there must be an identifiable prima facie right that 
has been infringed. Secondly, the conduct must reasonably cause 
irreparable harm. Thirdly, there must be no other readily available remedy 
available for the plaintiff to prevent the continuation of such harm. The 
interdict is designed to give urgent interim relief until a final court order can 
be adjudicated and ensure that unlawful conduct is restrained.78 
However, as mentioned, within the collective bargaining power dynamics 
the current interlocutory powers have inherent dangers that are often 
prejudicial to workers.79 As noted by the Universal Product Network 
judgement,80 when the return date for the final order is far removed from the 
initial application, the momentum of the strike would have been lost and the 
                                            
negotiations or fall outside wage issues. See also Myburgh 2014 CLL 120 where he 
opines that the courts should be more inclined "to hold unions accountable for the 
unlawful conduct of their members and impose on them obligations to control their 
membership". See also Gericke 2012 THRHR 584-585 concludes that there is a 
need to revisit trade union liability in an effort to make trade unions and their 
members more accountable for their unlawful damaging actions; Rycroft "Role of 
Trade Unions in Strikes" 110-111 where the author advocates for responsible 
unionism during collective bargaining and the notion of "good faith bargaining". 
74  O'Regan 1988 ILJ 984 referred to this quotation by Wedderburn Worker and the Law 
686 as far back as 1988. 
75  Sections 68(1)-(2) of the LRA. 
76  Sections 68(2)(a)-(c) of the LRA. 
77  Cohen and Le Roux "Liability, Sanctions and other Consequences of Strike Action" 
154-155. See also Du Toit et al Labour Law Relations 358-359. 
78  Sections 68(1)-(2) of the LRA. See also Cohen and Le Roux "Liability, Sanctions and 
other Consequences of Strike Action" 154-155 and Du Toit et al Labour Law 
Relations 358-359. 
79  O'Regan 1988 ILJ 984. See also Rycroft 2014 IJCLLIR 203 where it is stated that 
"the interdict / injunction gives applicants - usually employers - a tactical advantage 
because the likelihood of a full trial is in most cases small, and the employer's widely 
expressed assertions of 'interference with business' or 'extreme violence' become 
prima facie evidence which the union has to disprove". 
80  Universal Product Network para 8. 
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collective bargaining scale would likely have become permanently tilted in 
favour of the applicant employer. This is because when granting an interdict 
which often occurs on an urgent basis, the threshold of evidence on the 
applicant employer is lower in light of the assumed urgency coupled with 
alleged violent strike misconduct.81 
The Universal Product Network judgement must, however be commended 
for considering the facts objectively, by separating the corn from the chaff, 
and finding that in this instance the alleged violence did not justify a 
confirmation of the rule nisi. The judgement also cautioned against abusive 
and inappropriate interference by the Labour Court by means of 
interlocutory orders during the process of collective bargaining.82 
Nonetheless, it is disappointing that despite this, in the presence of 
alternative remedies available to the employer, that the court considered the 
possibility of the alteration of the protected status of a strike which would 
invariably have swung the scales in favour of the employer. This would have 
had the effect that all of the consequences of unprotected strikes referred 
to above would have become effective. It is submitted that the Universal 
Product Network judgement should rather have placed the focus on exiting 
legal remedies which are available during protected and unprotected strikes 
rather than seeking to imply into the LRA the authority on the Labour Court 
to declare protected strikes to be unprotected on the grounds of violence.83 
Agreement had been reached on picket rules and the employer would likely 
have had powerful arguments to rely on had there been a real threat of 
violent industrial action. 
5.4 Existing judicial remedies against strike violence 
The ILO cautions that member states should take care against permitting 
monetary claims, such as common-law damages claims against workers, 
that could have the potential to inhibiting freedom of association or that 
could potentially destroy unions.84 Aligned to this, and as point of departure, 
the LRA provides that civil action based on delict or breach of contract may 
not be instituted against anyone for participation in a protected strike or 
                                            
81  In Universal Product Network para 7 it is noted by the court that "the commonly 
employed practice of seeking interim relief in urgent applications has more to do with 
the lower threshold faced by an applicant and the prospect of a return day six or 
eight weeks later, by which time any final order is usually academic". 
82  Universal Product Network para 8. 
83  As discussed below, despite the protected status of a strike, any offence (such as 
violence), remains unlawful conduct within the constitutional and legislative 
framework and such actions remain subject to delictual and contractual actions and 
could constitute a fair reason for dismissal. See also Manamela and Budeli 2013 
CILSA 329. 
84  ILO Freedom of Association paras 658-670. 
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picket.85 However, the LRA makes it clear that this immunity does "not apply 
to any act in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike or a lock-out, if that 
act is an offence".86 Any strike related violence during a protected strike 
which causes physical damage to employers would undoubtedly constitute 
an offence and this would automatically entitle employers to institute civil 
action against the perpetrators of such violence. 
Added to this, the LRA specifically provides for two additional court imposed 
remedies in respect of unprotected strike action. The first is the interdict 
(discussed above) and the second is an order for "just and equitable 
compensation" for any loss attributable to the strike or lock-out.87 This 
remedy presupposes that trade unions should accept their responsibility of 
ensuring that their members engage in strike action that complies with the 
prerequisites of the LRA.88 It is clear that this remedy does not equate to 
common law damages and it refers to an amount which is tempered by the 
dictates of fairness. 
In Algoa Bus Co (Pty) Ltd v Transport Action Retail & General Workers 
Union89 the Labour Court considered such a claim for compensation in 
circumstances where a trade union did nothing to encourage its members 
not to proceed with an unprotected strike despite the fact that an interdict 
had been issued against workers to continue with the strike. The employer 
had sustained losses of just more than R10 million rand,90 and taking the 
perilous financial situation of the trade union into account, and its ability to 
continue to represent its members, the Labour Court awarded the employer 
compensation in the amount of approximately R1,4 million rand. 
Apart from these judicial remedies, the LRA empowers employers to 
dismiss workers engaged in both protected, and unprotected strikes should 
their behaviour constitute misconduct.91 From the above, it is clear that 
unlawful conduct, which includes intimidation, assault and damage to 
property will attract both civil and criminal liability. It is against this 
background that, even though Manamela and Budeli deplore strike related 
                                            
85  Sections 67(2) and (6) of the LRA. 
86  Section 67(8) of the LRA. 
87  Section 68(1)(b) of the LRA. 
88  Cohen and Le Roux "Liability, Sanctions and other Consequences of Strike Action" 
155. 
89  Algoa Bus Co (Pty) Ltd v Transport Action Retail & General Workers Union 2015 36 
ILJ 2292 (LC). The amount had to be paid in monthly instalments of R5 280 by the 
trade union and R214,50 by each employee to be deducted from their salaries. 
90  Transport & Allied Workers Union of SA v Algoa Bus Co Pty (Ltd) 2015 36 ILJ 2148 
(LC). 
91  Sections 67(5) and 68(5) of the LRA. It should, however, be noted that such conduct 
must still adhere to the requisites of fair procedures, which include ultimatums and 
adherence to audi alteram partem. 
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violence, they argue that the LRA has established a careful balance of 
rights, obligations and remedies and should rights and duties be 
disregarded the LRA provides the necessary remedies to address protected 
and unprotected strike violence.92 
Despite the existence of a number of judicial remedies, commentators have 
suggested that Labour Court should adopt a more strict approach. Faced 
with the difficulty of identifying specific perpetrators of violence in a mob, 
Myburgh93 suggests that the Labour Court should relax the admission rules 
of hearsay evidence that corroborates and aides in the identification of 
perpetrators of violent conduct. To this he adds that the Labour Court should 
be more uncompromising in upholding the dismissal of workers engaged in 
unlawful misconduct during strikes and that this can be achieved through 
the strict legal application of item 6 of the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal.94 Manamela and Budeli also emphasise the fact that when 
considering the dismissal of employees engaged in violent strikes the 
transgressions should be proven by the employer on a balance of 
probabilities and not beyond all reasonable doubt. They mention that it 
leaves scope for the application of the criminal doctrine of "common 
purpose".95 
In sum, strikes that are not in compliance with the LRA are unprotected and 
any violence in protected or unprotected strikes is unlawful. The LRA 
provides that interdicts may be granted during the process of unprotected 
strikes. This is but one of the existing remedies that can potentially assist 
employers and to maintain peace during tumultuous collective bargaining 
negotiations. The other remedies range from delictual claims, breach of 
contract, claims for equitable compensation and criminal proceedings. 
However, before the courts will grant an interdict, or an order which declares 
a protected strike to be unprotected, it is submitted that the courts should 
first consider whether there are no available remedies. It is suggested, at 
the very least, that this much will be required by the Constitutional Court 
whenever the question about the limitation of the right to strike arises. 
6  Critique on the functionality test 
Mindful of the scourge of violent strikes in South Africa, the Universal 
Product Network judgement adopted Rycroft's functionality test which 
entails that the Labour Court could assume the power to alter the protected 
                                            
92  Manamela and Budeli 2013 CILSA 324-336. 
93  Myburgh 2013 CLL 6. 
94  Myburgh 2013 CLL 8. Item 6 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal sets out the 
appropriate procedures to be followed in relation to the dismissal of workers engaged 
in misconduct during strike action. 
95  Manamela and Budeli 2013 CILSA 327. 
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status of a strike to unprotected action on the basis of violence.96 It entails 
the weighing up of the level of violence against the efforts of the trade union 
to curb it in order for a court to determine whether a strike's protected status 
is still functional to collective bargaining. 
Rycroft originates his argument on the premise that there is an inseparable 
link between strikes and functional collective bargaining. He finds 
justification for this on three grounds. Firstly, the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 200 of 1993 provided that "workers have the right to strike 
for the purposes of collective bargaining".97 Secondly, strikes must be 
orderly. This is implied by the procedural requirements established by the 
LRA which relate to compulsory mediation and notification periods before 
striking workers are protected from delictual actions, dismissals, contractual 
breaches and civil liability.98 And, thirdly the strike must not involve 
misconduct. This he infers from the fact that employees engaged in 
misconduct can be dismissed irrespective of whether the strike is protected 
or not.99 
He further argues that the South African courts have recognised that strikes 
may lose their protected status should it no longer be functional to collective 
bargaining. He relies on two cases in particular which confirm this. In Afrox 
Ltd v SACWU 2100 it was held that strikes can lose their protected status 
should strikers abandon their demand or where the employer concedes to 
the workers' demand and the grievance falls away.101 This is a similar 
approach to the one adopted more recently by the CC in the Unitrans 
case.102 
He then makes the point that it is clear "that it is possible to argue that there 
can arise a point where a protected strike's protection is lost. So far in our 
law this mainly relates to the reason of the strike".103 It is submitted that up 
to here, his argument is pure, but he then leaps to the conclusion that this 
can be extended to strikes which involves violence. 
                                            
96  Universal Product Network para 32. 
97  Section 27(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
However, in a significant development the Constitution, 1996 removed this link and 
the right to strike and the right to engage in collective bargaining were established 
as two separate and independent rights. 
98  Rycroft 2014 IJCLLIR 202 refers to the "golden formula" which entails that certain 
procedural "steps must be taken and certain requirements met before strikers are 
protected from the civil and contractual liability that could arise from the strike". 
99  Rycroft 2014 IJCLLIR 202. See also s 67 of the LRA. 
100  Afrox Ltd v SACWU 2 1997 18 ILJ 406 (LC). 
101  Rycroft 2014 IJCLLIR 207. 
102  See the discussion in para 5.2 above. 
103  Rycroft 2014 IJCLLIR 207. 
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Without establishing a link between the reason for the strike and violence 
as stratagem to increase pressure, he refers to the second case, Tsogo Sun 
Casinos Pty(Ltd) t/a Montecasino v Future of South African Workers' Union 
where vehicles were damaged and passengers were dragged from their 
vehicles and assaulted. In this decision, the court made the obiter finding 
that that: 
[w]hen the tyranny of the mob displaces the peaceful exercise of economic 
pressure and the means to the end of the resolution of a labour dispute, one 
must question whether a strike continues to serve its purpose and thus 
whether it continues to enjoy protected status.104 
It is submitted that both Rycroft and Universal Product Network may have 
sought to reach a bridge too far by linking the falling away of the "underlying 
reason for a strike", which according to the Constitutional Court justifies the 
alteration of the protected status of a strike, to violence as a strategy to 
enforce a demand. Our argument is simply this: In an instance where 
workers demand higher wages in an attempt to establish a more equitable 
distribution of profits, and their attempts by peaceful means are 
unsuccessful, the reason for the strike could remain the same irrespective 
should the workers' actions turn to violent means. There is, in other words, 
no unseverable link between the grievance in dispute, and the mechanism 
by means of which it is attained. This does not make violent strike action 
acceptable, but it does not alter the fact that the demand has not been 
withdrawn, or that the grievance had been resolved. 
There seems merit in Fergus' critique levelled against Rycroft (and 
Universal Product Network) in so far as she finds a different historical 
foundation for the so-called functionality test. Contrary to the way in which 
this test is currently being referred to, it was a notion that was developed to 
justify why workers have the right not be dismissed during strikes. She 
confirms this poignant point (albeit in the pre-constitutional era) by referring 
to the Labour Appeal Court decision in Black Allied Workers Union v 
Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel105 (hereafter Blue Waters Hotel) 
where it was succinctly held that the 
… right to strike is important and necessary to a system of collective 
bargaining. It underpins the system – it obliges the parties to engage 
thoughtfully and seriously with each other. … If an employer facing a strike 
could merely dismiss the strikers from employment by terminating their 
employment contracts then the strike would have little or no purpose. … The 
strike would cease to be functional to collective bargain and instead it would 
                                            
104  Tsogo Sun Casinos para 13. 
105  Black Allied Workers Union v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel 1993 14 ILJ 
963 (LAC) (hereafter Blue Waters Hotel). 
S VAN ECK AND T KUJINGA  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  19 
be an opportunity for the employer to take punitive action against the 
employees concerned.106 
We further agree with Fergus' questioning of Rycroft in promoting the 
"functionality principle" as the means of finding legal justification of 
containing violent conduct in strikes and to justify judicial intervention.107 Our 
previous analysis has made it clear that there is no constitutional or 
legislative authority that instructs that a strike must be "functional to 
collective bargaining" in order to be lawful.108 In our view, as long as the 
original demand deals with a matter which is not prohibited by the LRA, such 
as disputes of right which are eligible to be arbitrated or adjudicated, all 
strikes about matters about mutual interest are by their very nature 
functional to collective bargaining. 
A further obvious shortcoming of the Universal Product Network judgement 
in adopting the functionality test is that it fails to set out how the court would 
determine the acceptable degrees of unlawful conduct permissible before a 
strike may be declared unprotected.109 Moreover, it does not allude to recent 
failed attempts by NEDLAC to amend the LRA to empower the Labour Court 
to suspend a strike where the striking employees did not comply with 
picketing rules.110 This serves as indication that the legislature was not in 
favour of taking action towards extending the powers of the Labour Court to 
place limits on strikes. 
To what extent is the functionality test applicable against the current 
collective bargaining structure established by the LRA? Even though it is 
understandable that - against the backdrop of lawlessness in strikes - the 
Labour Court may be tempted to become more intrusive in collective 
bargaining,111 the courts should be cautioned not to overstep its statutory 
powers by altering the legal status of strikes. This is because the Labour 
Court should be vigilant not to assume particular powers into its jurisdiction 
where it is not explicitly stated and where this has the potential of imposing 
an unacceptable constitutional limitation on the fundamental right to 
strike.112 However, the assumption that the removal of the protected status 
of a strike is the only or the most effective remedy against strike violence 
must be dispelled. 
                                            
106  Blue Waters Hotel paras 972A-D. 
107  Fergus 2016 ILJ 1538. 
108  Fergus 2016 ILJ 1540-1545. 
109  Fergus 2016 ILJ 1546. 
110  See clause 9 of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill [B16-2012]; Rycroft 2015 ILJ 
12-15; and Fergus 2016 ILJ 1548. 
111  Myburgh 2013 CLL 2. 
112  Fergus 2016 ILJ 1548. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
Taking account of the stance adopted by the Constitutional Court in cases 
like Bader Bop and Unitrans it is predicted that this pinnacle court will make 
short thrift of the adoption of the functionality test. Both these cases were 
mindful of the fact that the constitutional right to strike operates as an 
independent right, which is not derived from other constitutional rights, such 
as the rights to freedom of association or the right to engage in collective 
bargaining. On the facts, both of these cases provided the right to strike with 
a wide meaning which is not susceptible to implied limitations which have 
not been catered for expressly in the LRA. 
The authors of this contribution are not unsympathetic towards attempts by 
commentators and the courts to curb violent strikes which undoubtedly hold 
the potential to erode the fundamental rights to security of persons and 
property as enshrined in the Constitution, 1996. However, remedies will 
have to be sought in other places than in permitting the Labour Court to 
influence the collective bargaining balance by changing protected status of 
strikes. This would only be doable once the social partners have persuaded 
the legislature to amend the LRA to that effect. Until such time, those 
effected by violent strikes will have to make do with the current remedies 
contained in the wording of the LRA. In the interim, it may mean that the 
Labour Court may have to be more bold when providing existing remedies 
to victims of violent strikes, by ordering interdicts against violence (rather 
than the strike), by awarding significant claims for just and equitable 
compensation against unlawful strikes and, notwithstanding it being 
ineffectual at present, ordering enforcement by the police. 
Briefly summed up, the LRA is a comprehensive legislative framework 
supported by a number of Codes of Good Practice that proffer various 
remedies of addressing violent conduct in strikes.113 The LRA explicitly 
highlights the procedure to be followed when securing legal protection of a 
strike and consequences of a strike not in compliance with the Act. 
Moreover, the powers of the Labour Court range from granting of interdicts, 
orders of just and equitable compensation to declaratory orders. The LRA 
does not rule out the possibility of delictual action and breach of contract; or 
fair dismissal and civil proceedings for protected strike conduct that 
constitutes an offence. Furthermore, criminal acts remain offences 
regardless of the protected status of strikes thereby warranting criminal 
sanctions. However, the LRA does not seem to permit the expansion of the 
                                            
113  See the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal and the Code on Picketing. 
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interlocutory powers of the Labour Court into the alteration of the legal 
status of a strike. 
The South African government and the various social partners are not 
oblivious to the concerns plaguing the labour market.114 The on-going 
minimum wage discussions115 and the Ekurhuleni Declaration are 
testament to the intentions of government and society. Admittedly, more 
needs to be done, but collectively. There is an intrinsic equity balance that 
must always be sought in collective bargaining to reduce strikes. 
The recognition and protection of the right to strike is a proactive affirmation 
by the Constitution, 1996 to balance the inherently unequal bargaining 
power that exists in industrial relations. The role of the Labour Court needs 
to be re-evaluated to ascertain whether the court can play a constructive 
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